La enseñanza de la filosofía en el siglo XIX (3)

por Erich Luna

Hegel4

Luego de esto se reformula la segunda cuestión:

“The history of philosophy is made to contain philosophically interesting material and nothing much else,
especially not the teaching system or the disciplinary structure that demands such a restriction in the first place. So the legend works. But how does it work exactly? This is the second question mentioned before: Is ‘doing the history of philosophy’ a task of the philosopher, and in what way?” (10)
.

Hegel es el caso paradigmático de una lectura filosófica de la historia de la filosofía:

“There is probably no better example than Hegel if one wants to check what Harold Bloom would call “a strong reading”—in this case, of the history of philosophy. Heidegger was certainly right and expressed the opinion of many when he wrote that no one since Hegel had been able to muster the whole of the history of philosophy
in a similarly convincing way. Moreover, Hegel actually believed in the idea that the history of philosophy can be read philosophically. Kant had asked himself whether an a priori history of philosophy was at all possible. Hegel plainly wrote it down in his introduction to his lecture courses on the history of philosophy. He turned the reading of the history of philosophy into a legend in the proper sense of the word—a legenda historiae philosophiae” (10).

Hegel fue uno de los primeros profesores de filosofía que empezó a dar clases sobre la historia de la filosofía. Su manera de entender este devenir histórico  es el del progresivo desarrollo del sistema de la ciencia. Schneider sostiene que sus clases eran algo diferentes al enfoque mismo que tenía en sus introducciones. Resalta, asímismo, el que haya un duro crítico de los historiadores de la filosofía de su época, como Tennemann. Sus lecciones no tenían excesiva erudición. Al abordar a un filósofo hacía breves menciones y detalles biográficos, a menos que sean esenciales. Sobre las obras mismas, se basaba en lo que pensaba que era lo esencial, lo que podríamos llamar “lo propiamente filosófico”:

“He was always looking for the main principle, which he also called “the philosophical” (das Philosophische), “standpoint” (Standpunkt), “the general” (das Allgemeine), “the main question” (die Hauptfrage), “the main point of view” (der Hauptgesichtspunkt), “the main interest” (das Hauptinteresse), “fundamental interest” (Grundinteresse), “main determination” (Hauptbestimmung), and “main maxim” (Hauptgrundsatz)” (11).

Es importante, para Schneider, diferenciar entre lo que Hegel prometía hacer y lo que efectivamente hacía en sus clases, además de, resaltar el papel eminentemente crítico que tenía de la historia de la filosofía, en lugar del carácter apologético que se le suele atribuir:

“Hegel was less a prophet than a critic. Faithful to his criteria of the philosophical essential, he dismissed as “philosophically not interesting” the mythical form of truth in Plato, the Roman Stoics, Epicur’s metaphysics, the whole of Arab and Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages, scholasticism, the religious and political writings of
Hobbes and Locke, and the popular writings of Fichte, to give a few examples. It is not at all astonishing to hear these verdicts: it is just another mark of the typical, and not extraordinary, character of Hegel’s lecture course that those verdicts were spoken. In front of his Berlin audience, Hegel was fighting the philosophical past; he wanted to revive and bring to life what he thought was actual thinking. He did a great job, considering the extent to which he was willing to go: he almost never finished his course properly, even when lecturing
more than four times a week. He also spent more than half of his time on Greek philosophy and later jumped whole centuries and many systems, because they would not bring new principles. Whatever Hegel was doing while lecturing, he was not putting forward any convincing philosophy that would absorb, so to speak, the history of philosophy and make it part of the system. This is just what he pretended in his introduction. In lecturing, Hegel did what most other philosophy professors would do: he commented on what was known about past philosophies” (12).

La conclusión que saca Schneider acerca de Hegel es la de pensar la historia de la filosofía como algún tipo de desarrollo, pero asumiendo, al mismo tiempo, que no puede haber tal cosa como una deducción a priori:

“Historical knowledge cannot be deduced from anywhere else—not even historical knowledge about
philosophy from the idea of philosophy. What existing links there are among past philosophies is material enough to deal with: philosophers relate mostly one to another by criticism or adherence. And Hegel was right in demanding that the present must know what kind of history it produces. In the end, a truly philosophical history of philosophy is possible only if the term history is replaced by the term development. That much we can learn from Hegel” (13).

La especialización de la historia de la filosofía, y de su enseñanza, en el siglo XIX era pública, a diferencia de la hecha en el siglo XVIII, que era privada. Sintetizando el movimiento de la enseñanza de la historia de la filosofía, Schneider nos dice lo siguiente:

“Most authors of historical works were then also professors of philosophy, and historical knowledge played an ever-more-important role in the curriculum. A legend arose at the same time, making the history of philosophy an introduction to or a part of philosophy itself. The legend implied that philosophy had “a special relation to
intellectual history” or even that it “owned its history.” However, the legend could not account for the new discipline that was created during the 19th century: the study of philosophy as a field of regular activity on both the teachers’ and the students’ sides. This new discipline was called philosophy by those who worked in it, and
university philosophy by its critics like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The study of philosophy reframed historical knowledge about philosophy within the seminar through collective reading and interpreting, and within the lecture course through renarrating and commenting” (14).

En conclusión, es intersante ver este movimiento en el siglo XIX, dado que somos, prácticamente, sus herederos inmediatos. Es importante que si es que nos tomamos en serio la historicidad y el giro hermnéutico, nos tomemos en serio, también, el devenir histórico de la propia manera como la historia de la filosofía ha ido comprendiéndose y concibiéndose, así como lo que se entiende por formación y educación en filosofía. Es así que podremos abordar mejor qué es la filosofía, cuál es su campo, si es que tiene algún método, así como indagar en cuál es la mejor manera de ser formado en ella, con el fin de poder filosofar y no, meramente, saber muchos “datos”, “fechas”, “curiosidades” y “anécdotas de sobremesa”.

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